{"id":772,"date":"2026-05-06T10:38:47","date_gmt":"2026-05-06T14:38:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/?p=772"},"modified":"2026-06-25T13:07:11","modified_gmt":"2026-06-25T17:07:11","slug":"guyana-reformas-capacidad-de-crecimiento","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/blog\/guyana-reforms-growth-capacity\/","title":{"rendered":"Reformas en Guyana 1991-1996: El crecimiento super\u00f3 la capacidad del Estado"},"content":{"rendered":"

La r\u00e1pida estabilizaci\u00f3n requiri\u00f3 una mayor capacidad estatal.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A principios de la d\u00e9cada de 1990, Guyana pas\u00f3 de controles de precios, tipo de cambio racionado y empresas estatales a precios de mercado, producci\u00f3n privada y capital externo. Entre 1991 y 1996, las reformas remodelaron la agricultura, la miner\u00eda y el comercio. El programa cambi\u00f3 los incentivos, las instituciones y las estructuras de producci\u00f3n. La experiencia es importante porque distorsiones graves las econom\u00edas pueden estabilizarse y crecer r\u00e1pidamente<\/a> cuando la disciplina macroecon\u00f3mica y la reforma institucional avanzan juntas. Tambi\u00e9n expuso la d\u00e9bil administraci\u00f3n, brechas de infraestructura<\/a>, y las tensiones sociales que moldearon qui\u00e9n se benefici\u00f3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Los responsables pol\u00edticos se enfrentaban a una tarea urgente: desmantelar un sistema insostenible caracterizado por la hiperinflaci\u00f3n, el colapso de la producci\u00f3n y una deuda externa superior al 700% del PIB. Los precios estaban distorsionados, el sector informal era muy extenso y el Estado dominaba una actividad que no pod\u00eda financiar. El objetivo era lograr una econom\u00eda de mercado con precios estables, un crecimiento impulsado por el sector privado, unas exportaciones m\u00e1s s\u00f3lidas y la recuperaci\u00f3n de la credibilidad. La tensi\u00f3n radicaba en la rapidez. Los funcionarios ten\u00edan que desmantelar el antiguo r\u00e9gimen lo suficientemente r\u00e1pido como para reactivar el crecimiento, sin romper la capacidad ni la estabilidad social.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Los responsables pol\u00edticos deben combinar la estabilizaci\u00f3n macroecon\u00f3mica con reformas institucionales que incentiven la producci\u00f3n y la inversi\u00f3n, a la vez que protegen la capacidad de implementaci\u00f3n y la estabilidad social. La recuperaci\u00f3n de Guyana demuestra que las reformas sostenidas e integrales pueden restaurar r\u00e1pidamente el crecimiento, pero dependen de la continuidad pol\u00edtica y soporte externo<\/a>. Este blog hace tres afirmaciones: el crecimiento y las exportaciones se recuperaron r\u00e1pidamente; las reformas funcionaron al reajustar los incentivos y responder a la presi\u00f3n externa; y el Estado rehizo los mercados pero tuvo dificultades para ejecutarlos. La conclusi\u00f3n pr\u00e1ctica es la secuenciaci\u00f3n: gestionar las limitaciones de capacidad y construir instituciones que sostengan la recuperaci\u00f3n.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La liberalizaci\u00f3n de precios impuls\u00f3 r\u00e1pidamente la producci\u00f3n y las exportaciones.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Los resultados cambiaron r\u00e1pidamente a medida que el crecimiento, la producci\u00f3n y el comercio se expand\u00edan en sectores clave. El PIB real creci\u00f3 alrededor del 7,1 % anual a principios de la d\u00e9cada de 1990. Esto revirti\u00f3 una ca\u00edda anual de aproximadamente el 3,1 % registrada durante la d\u00e9cada anterior y elev\u00f3 la renta per c\u00e1pita por encima de su nivel de 1976. La inflaci\u00f3n cay\u00f3 de m\u00e1s del 100 % en 1991 a un d\u00edgito al final del per\u00edodo, lo que reflej\u00f3 una pol\u00edtica fiscal y monetaria m\u00e1s restrictiva y un r\u00e9gimen cambiario m\u00e1s estable. Las exportaciones aumentaron de unos 1 420 millones de d\u00f3lares en 1990 a 1 457,5 millones de d\u00f3lares en 1996, impulsadas por la agricultura, los minerales y la madera. La econom\u00eda se orient\u00f3 hacia el exterior y la disponibilidad de divisas aument\u00f3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La producci\u00f3n del sector se dispar\u00f3 al cambiar los incentivos. La agricultura duplic\u00f3 su valor. Producci\u00f3n de az\u00facar y arroz<\/a> se dispar\u00f3, respaldada por mejores precios, una gesti\u00f3n mejorada y vol\u00famenes de exportaci\u00f3n m\u00e1s altos. La producci\u00f3n de oro aument\u00f3 de 42.500 onzas troy en 1990 a casi 390.000 onzas troy para 1994, despu\u00e9s de la reforma del tipo de cambio y la entrada de la miner\u00eda a gran escala. La producci\u00f3n forestal casi se triplic\u00f3 en el mismo per\u00edodo, ya que las nuevas concesiones atrajeron inversi\u00f3n extranjera. La recuperaci\u00f3n se extendi\u00f3 a los sectores primarios vinculados a demanda externa<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Persistieron las deficiencias estructurales en materia de infraestructura, capital humano y distribuci\u00f3n. La rehabilitaci\u00f3n de las obras p\u00fablicas se retras\u00f3. Solo se desembols\u00f3 alrededor del 54% de la inversi\u00f3n prevista, mientras que los sectores de la energ\u00eda, el transporte y las defensas costeras segu\u00edan presentando deficiencias. La pobreza se redujo de aproximadamente el 75% en 1989 a unos 43% en 1993, pero persistieron las disparidades entre las regiones costeras y las del interior. Los salarios del sector p\u00fablico se mantuvieron bajos, lo que aliment\u00f3 emigraci\u00f3n calificada<\/a> y la prestaci\u00f3n de servicios se debilit\u00f3. El per\u00edodo arroj\u00f3 un fuerte crecimiento, pero el cambio estructural y las ganancias sociales se mantuvieron desiguales.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Los incentivos y las finanzas condicionales mantuvieron el avance de las reformas.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

La reforma funcion\u00f3 al restablecer los incentivos en toda la econom\u00eda. Las autoridades eliminaron la mayor\u00eda de los controles de precios. Unificaron y liberalizaron el tipo de cambio, permitiendo que las se\u00f1ales del mercado guiaran la producci\u00f3n y el comercio. Estas medidas sacaron la actividad de los mercados paralelos y la incorporaron a la econom\u00eda formal, aumentando la producci\u00f3n registrada y los ingresos fiscales. Los productores respondieron r\u00e1pidamente, especialmente en la agricultura y la miner\u00eda, donde los rendimientos aumentaron con la liberalizaci\u00f3n. La realineaci\u00f3n de incentivos ayud\u00f3 a impulsar el auge de las exportaciones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Las presiones externas e internas mantuvieron las reformas en curso. La crisis de finales de los a\u00f1os ochenta oblig\u00f3 a la adopci\u00f3n de un Programa de Recuperaci\u00f3n Econ\u00f3mica respaldado por instituciones financieras internacionales. El acceso a la financiaci\u00f3n depend\u00eda del cumplimiento de las condiciones de ajuste estructural, incluidos el endurecimiento fiscal, la liberalizaci\u00f3n comercial y la privatizaci\u00f3n. El alivio de la deuda redujo las obligaciones externas y cre\u00f3 espacio fiscal, pero se produjo junto con una condicionalidad continua. La continuidad pol\u00edtica tras la transici\u00f3n democr\u00e1tica de 1992 ayud\u00f3 a prevenir la reversi\u00f3n.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Con el tiempo, las autoridades incorporaron reformas en las instituciones. Los sucesivos programas de ajuste profundizaron la reforma financiera, la privatizaci\u00f3n y la reestructuraci\u00f3n fiscal. La nueva legislaci\u00f3n sobre regulaci\u00f3n financiera y administraci\u00f3n de ingresos estableci\u00f3 reglas orientadas al mercado. A medida que mejor\u00f3 la estabilidad, aument\u00f3 la confianza y m\u00e1s actividad se traslad\u00f3 a los canales formales, reforzando el crecimiento. La reforma del servicio civil se retras\u00f3 y la escasez de mano de obra calificada limit\u00f3 la prestaci\u00f3n de programas p\u00fablicos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

El estado reinici\u00f3 los mercados pero tuvo dificultades para cumplir.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

El estado inici\u00f3 y mantuvo el impulso de la reforma. Se pas\u00f3 de desarrollo liderado por el estado<\/a> hacia un sistema orientado al mercado a trav\u00e9s de marcos de pol\u00edticas coordinados con instituciones internacionales. Tambi\u00e9n construy\u00f3 una coalici\u00f3n de socios externos que proporcionaron financiaci\u00f3n, apoyo t\u00e9cnico y orientaci\u00f3n de pol\u00edticas. El gobierno alcanz\u00f3 un consenso durante la transici\u00f3n democr\u00e1tica y mantuvo las reformas. Dicha alineaci\u00f3n hizo posible una r\u00e1pida estabilizaci\u00f3n.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

El Estado tambi\u00e9n redefini\u00f3 las reglas de mercado y los incentivos. Elimin\u00f3 los controles de precios, liberaliz\u00f3 el sistema de comercio y de cambio, y estableci\u00f3 marcos regulatorios para las instituciones financieras. La privatizaci\u00f3n y los contratos de gesti\u00f3n privada transfirieron activos y operaciones a actores privados, especialmente en los sectores azucarero, minero y de servicios p\u00fablicos. Las reformas fiscales ampliaron la base impositiva y redujeron la dependencia de incentivos discrecionales. Estos pasos abrieron espacio para la expansi\u00f3n privada y el crecimiento de las exportaciones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Capacidad de implementaci\u00f3n<\/a> sigui\u00f3 siendo una restricci\u00f3n vinculante. El empleo p\u00fablico cay\u00f3 dr\u00e1sticamente, mientras que los bajos salarios impulsaron la emigraci\u00f3n y dejaron puestos t\u00e9cnicos vacantes. Los programas de inversi\u00f3n tropezaron con fallas de coordinaci\u00f3n, retrasos en las adquisiciones y falta de personal. La rehabilitaci\u00f3n a\u00fan estaba por debajo de las expectativas, lo que limit\u00f3 las ganancias de productividad que la inversi\u00f3n privada podr\u00eda generar. El Estado pudo cambiar pol\u00edticas y construir mercados, pero luch\u00f3 por ejecutarlos a gran escala.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La reforma duradera depende de la capacidad y el equilibrio.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Los responsables de la formulaci\u00f3n de pol\u00edticas deben combinar la disciplina macroecon\u00f3mica con una inversi\u00f3n estrat\u00e9gica en capacidad estatal<\/a> y la estabilidad social si desean que la recuperaci\u00f3n sea duradera. Guyana demuestra que la estabilizaci\u00f3n generalizada y las reformas de mercado pueden producir un crecimiento r\u00e1pido cuando los incentivos se alinean y el compromiso pol\u00edtico se mantiene. Un estado final duradero se parece al crecimiento liderado por el sector privado, respaldado por instituciones p\u00fablicas que pueden ofrecer infraestructura y servicios. Los tres pilares explican por qu\u00e9 el camino fue cre\u00edble y por qu\u00e9 se mantuvo incompleto sin un fortalecimiento institucional m\u00e1s profundo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Las exportaciones crearon la base para la recuperaci\u00f3n, pero no eliminaron las restricciones en infraestructura y distribuci\u00f3n. Las reformas se implementaron porque reconfiguraron los incentivos, respondieron a la presi\u00f3n de la crisis e incorporaron nuevas reglas que apoyaron la actividad del mercado. La acci\u00f3n estatal permiti\u00f3 el cambio a trav\u00e9s de pol\u00edticas, regulaciones y coordinaci\u00f3n, pero la limitada capacidad y la p\u00e9rdida de capital humano restringieron la ejecuci\u00f3n. La lecci\u00f3n es que una recuperaci\u00f3n r\u00e1pida es posible, pero se mantiene fr\u00e1gil sin profundidad institucional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

El mismo cambio que puso fin a los controles de precios y levant\u00f3 la producci\u00f3n muestra tanto la promesa como los l\u00edmites del crecimiento impulsado por reformas. Cuando los responsables pol\u00edticos alinean los incentivos, obtienen apoyo externo y mantienen la continuidad pol\u00edtica, la producci\u00f3n y las exportaciones pueden expandirse r\u00e1pidamente en condiciones de mercado. Las prioridades incluyen mantener la disciplina fiscal, invertir en infraestructura, fortalecer la capacidad del sector p\u00fablico y mantener programas sociales espec\u00edficos vinculados a los sistemas existentes. La lecci\u00f3n central es clara: el crecimiento puede regresar r\u00e1pidamente, pero sin instituciones que implementen y sostengan las reformas, la recuperaci\u00f3n seguir\u00e1 siendo incompleta. El Rupununi, el coraz\u00f3n de la biodiversidad de Guyana y un caso de prueba clave para el desarrollo y la conservaci\u00f3n, se explora en Rupununi: Redescubriendo un mundo perdido<\/a>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Fast stabilization required a stronger state capacity. In the early 1990s, Guyana moved from price controls, rationed foreign exchange, and state-owned firms to market pricing, private production, and external capital. Between 1991 and 1996, reforms reshaped agriculture, mining, and trade. The program changed incentives, institutions, and production structures. The experience matters because badly distorted economies […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":278841165,"featured_media":773,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":true,"token":"eyJpbWciOiJodHRwczpcL1wvdGVjaHJldmxhYy5vcmdcL3dwLWNvbnRlbnRcL3VwbG9hZHNcLzIwMjZcLzA1XC9TY3JlZW5zaG90LTIwMjYtMDUtMDYtYXQtOS4yOC4wMy1BTS5wbmciLCJ0eHQiOiJHdXlhbmEgUmVmb3JtcyAxOTkxXHUyMDEzMTk5NjogR3Jvd3RoIE91dHBhY2VkIFN0YXRlIENhcGFjaXR5IiwidGVtcGxhdGUiOiJoaWdod2F5IiwiZm9udCI6IiIsImJsb2dfaWQiOjI1MzY0MTgzMn0.v-cJSJ4M6i1Zt5owaDPne1pGI90cqwA76ANEgmf5rFoMQ"},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[1711],"tags":[1496,1498,1412,1452,1407,1499,1497,1391],"class_list":["post-772","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-research-case-study","tag-economic-reform","tag-exchange-rate","tag-export-led-growth","tag-guyana","tag-infrastructure","tag-public-administration","tag-stabilization","tag-state-capacity"],"yoast_head":"\nGuyana\u2019s 1991\u20131996 reforms: growth vs capacity - 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The question now is whether these systems are performing well enough to govern a\u2026","rel":"","context":"En \u00abResearch Case Study\u00bb","block_context":{"text":"Research Case Study","link":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/blog\/category\/research-case-study\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"Floating production, storage, and offloading vessel operating offshore, with support ships nearby and gas flaring visible at sunset.","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-5.36.41-PM.png?fit=1178%2C622&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-5.36.41-PM.png?fit=1178%2C622&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-5.36.41-PM.png?fit=1178%2C622&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-5.36.41-PM.png?fit=1178%2C622&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-5.36.41-PM.png?fit=1178%2C622&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":235,"url":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/blog\/why-economies-change-lessons-from-evolutionary-economics\/","url_meta":{"origin":772,"position":3},"title":"Por qu\u00e9 las econom\u00edas cambian: lecciones de la econom\u00eda evolutiva","author":"Graham Watkins","date":"marzo 26, 2026","format":false,"excerpt":"Over forty years ago, Nelson and Winter argued that economies evolve through a process like biological evolution: firms follow routines, experiment with new ways of doing things, and those that succeed grow while others decline. Technological revolutions accelerate this process by reshaping industries, altering competitive advantages, and shifting geopolitical power.\u2026","rel":"","context":"En \u00abFramework Essay\u00bb","block_context":{"text":"Framework Essay","link":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/blog\/category\/framework-essay\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"Split image showing an oil refinery on one side and wind turbines, solar panels, and electric vehicle chargers on the other.","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-12.01.17-PM.png?fit=1184%2C1184&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-12.01.17-PM.png?fit=1184%2C1184&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-12.01.17-PM.png?fit=1184%2C1184&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-12.01.17-PM.png?fit=1184%2C1184&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-26-at-12.01.17-PM.png?fit=1184%2C1184&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":677,"url":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/blog\/panama-crisis-recovery\/","url_meta":{"origin":772,"position":4},"title":"Panam\u00e1 despu\u00e9s de 1989: qu\u00e9 tan r\u00e1pido se puede reconstruir una econom\u00eda rota \u2014 y qu\u00e9 velocidad deja atr\u00e1s","author":"Graham Watkins","date":"abril 24, 2026","format":false,"excerpt":"A tight window for change after crisis Panama entered the 1990s after a severe economic collapse. Political crisis, sanctions, and the December 1989 U.S. military intervention had cut output by more than 20% in the late 1980s. GDP rebounded by 3.4% in 1990. 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Collapse Exposed the Hidden Logic. In December 2001, Argentines found their savings frozen, crowds filled the streets banging pots and pans, and President Fernando de la Rua left the Casa Rosada by helicopter. Five presidents followed in rapid succession. Eighteen months earlier, international institutions\u2026","rel":"","context":"En \u00abCase Studies\u00bb","block_context":{"text":"Case Studies","link":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/blog\/category\/case-studies\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"People queue at a Buenos Aires bank during Argentina's Convertibility Plan years.","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Screenshot-2026-06-05-at-2.09.45-PM.png?fit=1200%2C665&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Screenshot-2026-06-05-at-2.09.45-PM.png?fit=1200%2C665&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Screenshot-2026-06-05-at-2.09.45-PM.png?fit=1200%2C665&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Screenshot-2026-06-05-at-2.09.45-PM.png?fit=1200%2C665&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Screenshot-2026-06-05-at-2.09.45-PM.png?fit=1200%2C665&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/techrevlac.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Screenshot-2026-05-06-at-9.28.03-AM.png?fit=904%2C494&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/772","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/278841165"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=772"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/772\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2158,"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/772\/revisions\/2158"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/773"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=772"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=772"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/techrevlac.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=772"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}